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LOCAL PUBLIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP  
AND JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN A  
EURO-AMERICAN AND GLOBAL  
PERSPECTIVE 
CHRISTIAN IAIONE∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Local public entrepreneurship encompasses a variety of activities 
carried out by local governments designed to foster local economic 
development. In this Article, I present local public entrepreneurship as a 
windfall of the right to local self-government. In Part II, I discuss the 
competing scholarship on the role local governments take in competing 
with each other by creating incentives to entice citizens and businesses 
into their jurisdictions. Then, in Part III, I present the concept of local 
public entrepreneurism and detail how local governments utilize such 
activism in competition with other governments. In the following three 
parts, I examine the intersection of local self-government and local public 
entrepreneurism in the Italian, European, and American legal frameworks. 
I explore the impact of globalization on this phenomenon in Part VII. In 
the following part, I present two cases—one from the European Union 
(EU) and one from the U.S.—in which local public entrepreneurship 
played a major role. I examine how the European Court of Justice (E.C.J.) 
has discouraged local governments from engaging in such activities, 
thereby undermining the right to local self-government. By contrast, the 
U.S. legal system actively encourages a high level of local public 
entrepreneurship for the production of urban services and infrastructure. 
Finally, I advocate for the formal recognition of the economic liberty of 
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local governments and the implementation of democratic counterbalances 
to such liberty as an alternative to judicial intervention.  
II. TOCCATA (OR PRELUDE) . . . : THE HAYEK-HYPOTHESIS. LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS AS COMPETING QUASI-COMMERCIAL CORPORATIONS1 
Since its birth, the Tiebout model2 has divided the field of local 
government scholarship into two main schools of thought: its supporters 
and its critics. I build on Charles Tiebout’s hypothesis that local 
governments compete with each other, but analyze this phenomenon from 
a slightly different perspective. 
Tiebout’s cutting-edge study theorized that local governments compete 
with each other for taxpayers by offering packages of local public goods at 
competitive tax-prices.3 From this standpoint, local governments act like 
private firms that compete for consumers by offering competitively priced 
goods. The “full mobility” of citizens is the crucial device ensuring 
efficiency. Taxpayers can leave inefficient cities for cities that produce 
preferred public services at lower tax-prices. 
In the Tiebout model, local governments are not the dynamic players in 
the game of interlocal competition. Richard Briffault has underscored that 
the “dynamic element in the public sector marketplace is the individual, 
or, in Tiebout’s terminology, ‘the consumer-voter.’”4 Individuals have the 
ability to “shop around” between local governments, and the “multiplicity 
of localities assures a range of choices and increases the likelihood that 
one locality will approximate the mobile consumer-voter’s preferences.”5 
 
 
 1. Toccata is a piece of classical music mainly for organs, composed to emphasize the dexterity 
of the performer. Toccatas for the organ are often followed by an independent fugue movement. The 
fugue begins with a theme, known as the subject, stated alone in one voice. A second voice then enters 
and plays the same theme, beginning on a different degree of the scale. The remaining voices enter one 
by one, each beginning by stating the same theme (with their first notes alternating between the same 
two different degrees of the scale). The remainder of the fugue develops the material further using all 
of the voices and, usually, multiple statements of the theme. 11 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 
814 (15th ed. 1986). 
 2. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). 
 3. Id. at 421–23. 
 4. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 
346, 400 (1990) (“The central mechanism for revealing public service preferences is relocation: ‘The 
act of moving or failing to move . . . replaces the usual market test of willingness to buy a good and 
reveals the consumer-voter’s demand for public goods.’ By settling in a particular locality, ‘the 
consumer-voter may be viewed as picking that community which best satisfies his preference pattern 
for public goods.’ People decide on the taxes they want to pay and the type and level of services they 
want to receive by ‘shopping around’ among the various localities in a given metropolitan area before 
‘purchasing’ by moving to the one that best fits their needs.”). 
 5. Id. 
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Interestingly, Friederich Hayek, an ardent proponent of laissez-faire 
economics, supports an active role for local governments in their 
economies.6 According to Hayek, competition amongst local governments 
would encourage those entities 
to offer a combination of advantages and costs which [make] life 
within their territory at least as attractive as elsewhere within the 
reach of its potential citizens. Assuming their powers to be so 
limited by law as not to restrict free migration, and that they could 
not discriminate in taxation, their interest would be wholly to attract 
those who in their particular condition could make the greatest 
contribution to the common product.7 
The result would be “the revival of a communal spirit which has been 
largely suffocated by centralization.”8 
These differing views of the role of local governments have seemed 
like mere “prophecies” destined to remain unrealized. However, aspects of 
these theories have recently materialized due to the globalization of social, 
economic and legal relationships. 
 
 
 6. 3 FRIEDERICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A 
FREE PEOPLE 146 (1979). 
 7. Hayek posits that: 
Most service activities now rendered by central government could be devolved to regional or 
local authorities which would possess the power to raise taxes at a rate they could determine 
but which they could levy or apportion only according to general rules laid down by central 
legislature. 
 I believe the result would be the transformation of local and even regional governments 
into quasi-commercial corporations competing for citizens. 
. . . . The widely felt inhumanity of the modern society is not so much the result of the 
impersonal character of the economic process, in which modern man of necessity works 
largely for aims of which he is ignorant, but of the fact that political centralization has largely 
deprived him of the chance to have a say in shaping the environment which he knows. The 
great Society can only be an abstract society—an economic order from which the individual 
profits by obtaining the means for all his ends, and to which he must make his anonymous 
contribution. This does not satisfy his emotional, personal needs. To the ordinary individual it 
is much more important to take part in the direction of his local affairs that are now taken 
largely out of the hands of men he knows and can learn to trust, and transferred to a remoter 
bureaucracy which to him is an inhuman machine. And while within the sphere which the 
individual knows, it can only be beneficial to rouse his interest and induce him to contribute 
his knowledge and opinion, it can produce only disdain for all politics if he is mostly called 
upon to express views on maters which do not recognizably concern him.  
Id. at 146–47. 
8. Id. 
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III. . . . AND FUGUE: LOCAL PUBLIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND LOCAL 
SELF-GOVERNMENT 
At the outset, it is necessary to use a heuristic tool to guide in the 
investigation of Hayek’s hypothesis. The tool I utilize is the concept of 
local public entrepreneurism.9 This is the “fugue,”10 and it may have 
interesting ramifications for the study of competition amongst local 
governments. My goal is to carve out a principled justification for 
legislative and judicial intervention on behalf of local governments who 
regard such interventions as excessively burdensome. 
For the purposes of the present study, I define “local public 
entrepreneurship” as embodying all the commercial and industrial 
activities in which local governments engage, either directly or indirectly, 
for the purpose of accomplishing their mission. Primarily, this mission is 
to foster the well-being of their constituency and, more notably, to 
encourage local economic development.11 Local government economic 
activism should generate and retain business, drawing individuals and 
firms through expenditures on infrastructure, capital projects, public 
relations, marketing, and a vast array of other business-oriented 
initiatives.12 The objective is to attract citizens, firms and investment into 
the jurisdiction and away from similar jurisdictions. 
In order to accomplish their mission, local authorities must provide 
goods and services to both their actual and potential constituencies. As 
Baker and Gillette explain, “different localities distinguish themselves by 
offering different packages of goods and services.”13 This creates a market 
of local goods and services. Citizen-consumers choose the city that 
maximizes their preferences at the lowest tax-price.  
I look at this phenomenon from a slightly different perspective. Tiebout 
and his successors offered a consumer-oriented vision of local economic 
 
 
 9. I adapt the terminology used in ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, PLANNING FOR SERFDOM: LEGAL 
ECONOMIC DISCOURSE AND DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT 10 (1991). 
 10. See supra note 1. 
 11. See, e.g., PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 22 (1981); Ann O’M. Bowman, The Visible 
Hand: Major Issues in City Economic Policy 7–8 (National League of Cities, Working Paper, 1987). 
According to Bowman’s survey, 86% of mayors surveyed ranked economic development among their 
three top priorities and 36.5% ranked it as their highest priority. Id. at 8. Regarding the legal, political, 
and economic implications of public/private cooperation, urban development and revitalization, see 
also MALLOY, supra note 9. In the landmark case Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), 
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that promoting economic development constitutes a “traditional and 
long accepted function of government.” Id. at 484. 
 12. See Clayton P. Gillette, Kelo and the Local Political Process, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 13, 14 
(2005). 
 13. LYNN A. BAKER & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 337 (3d ed. 2004). 
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entrepreneurship.14 In contrast, I embrace a business-oriented approach. 
My focus is on competition among local governments from the 
perspective of the supplier of public goods rather than from that of the 
buyer.  
In dealing with the supplier’s business strategies, I do not intend to 
cover supplier pricing policies. Therefore, I do not address how a local 
government’s taxing power can be used when competing with other 
governments. That subject has been extensively discussed.15 The fiscal 
well-being of most cities largely depends on taxpayers—both private 
individuals and businesses—moving to, remaining in, or departing from 
the city.16 However, city taxing powers are constrained by “cross-cutting 
pressures to hold taxes low enough to make the city attractive to 
businesses and affluent residents while keeping taxes high enough to fund 
essential infrastructure and social welfare programs.”17 Hence, at some 
point, cities must use something other than fiscal incentives to influence 
the migration of individuals and businesses.  
From this perspective, local governments seem close to fulfilling the 
Hayek hypothesis. Indeed, to foster economic growth, localities engage in 
a variety of activities aimed at creating a fertile environment for the birth 
of new enterprises or attracting more external investment. Not only do 
cities act as business operators, but they also choose the same tools that 
private firms utilize. Local governments rely increasingly on private 
corporate structures to deliver public goods. They also sign contracts and 
enter into complex transactions in order to build partnerships with each 
other or with private parties.18 
Provided that localities must compete with each other, they need to be 
relatively free to define the bundle of goods and services offered to their 
constituents. Briffault explains that “a fundamental premise of the Tiebout 
hypothesis is that localities possess substantial discretion over local taxing, 
spending and regulatory decisions. Although this premise usually passes 
unstated, Tiebout’s theory would make no sense without it, since it is this 
discretion that allows local governments to respond to consumer-voter 
preferences.”19 
 
 
 14. Tiebout, supra note 3, at 416–24. 
 15. See, e.g., WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 126–40 (1972). 
 16. See PETERSON, supra note 11, at 32–37; Briffault, supra note 5, at 351.  
 17. Briffault, supra note 5, at 351. 
 18. Gilliann E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1377–79 
(2003). 
 19. Briffault, supra note 5, at 405. 
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Thus, as economic entrepreneurs, cities need sufficient discretion to 
design pro-business and business-like strategies. This includes discretion 
to decide how to best accomplish their mission and which instruments to 
utilize in reaching their goals. For example, local governments usually 
directly provide some public goods and services. However, for many 
municipalities, there is an alternative to public production: privatization. 
Privatization takes different forms, but in broad terms it involves private 
production with either public partnership, regulation or mere oversight.20 
There are two main reasons to choose privatization. First, it is debatable 
whether local governments always function the same as other public 
governmental entities.21 Second, in many cases, privatization is preferable 
when the service corresponds to a normal entrepreneurial activity any 
economic actor could engage in (e.g., debt issue) or relates to sectors 
where the public provision (and monopoly) could be limited to just a 
specific part.22 
In principle, local public entrepreneurship therefore grants localities the 
freedom to decide the “what” and the “how” of local economic 
development. However, in some legal systems such economic freedom is 
not fully protected, and in some it is at stake. The question then becomes 
“who” makes the choices about the “what” and the “how” of local 
government economic activism. Such authority could be found in the law, 
the judiciary or local governments themselves. The ultimate answer may 
also be greatly influenced by the role of globalization. 
Before I turn to two case studies addressing this question, I need to 
make clear that I am assuming local public entrepreneurship is a product 
of the right to self-government that local governments hold in most highly 
decentralized legal systems. Therefore, in the next three parts, I briefly 
summarize how local self-government and local public entrepreneurship 
relate to each other in different legal frameworks.  
 
 
 20. The enduring debate between laissez-faire economics and public intervention is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
 21. This public/private distinction has been increasingly blurred. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The 
Constitutional Rights of Private Governments, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 144, 150 (2003). 
 22. See Clayton P. Gillette, Public Service: Opting Out of Public Provision, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 
1185, 1186–87 (1996). 
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IV. THE ITALIAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
A. The Role of Local Governments Under the Italian Constitution After 
the 2001 Devolution Reform 
Recent reforms to Italian constitutional law have greatly altered the 
framework of local government powers.23 In 2001, changes were made to 
Title V of the Italian Constitution, which defines the relationships between 
Italian regional and local governments, and in particular, to Article 118.24 
The Italian Constitution today grants autonomy to all sub-national 
levels of government. The entities composing the Italian Republic stand on 
equal footing, although they have different powers.25 The most relevant 
innovations grant municipalities “administrative functions” and discuss the 
principles of subsidiarity, differentiation and adequacy. These principles 
serve as safeguards to prerogatives of localities and to effective and 
uniform standards in public goods delivery.26 
 
 
 23. See Gian Franco Cartei & Vincenzo Ferraro, Reform of the Fifth Title of Italian Constitution: 
A First Step Towards a Federal System?, 8 EUR. PUB. L. 445 (2002); Erminio Ferrari, Planning, 
Building and Environmental Law After the Recent Italian Devolution, 8 EUR. PUB. L. 357 (2002); Gian 
Franco Cartei, Devolution and the Constitution: the Italian Perspective, 10 EUR. PUB. L. 33 (2004).  
 24. Constitutional Law no. 3 of Oct. 18, 2001, Gazz. Uff. no. 248 of Oct. 24, 2001, following 
Regional president direct election introduced by Constitutional Law no. 1 of Nov. 22, 1999, Gazz. Uff. 
no. 299 of Dec. 22, 1999 (ordinary Regions) and Constitutional Law no. 2 of Jan. 31, 2001, Gazz. Uff. 
no. 26 of Feb. 1, 2001 (special statute Regions). 
 25. Article 114 of the Italian Constitution states that “the Republic is constituted by 
Municipalities, Provinces, Metropolitan Cities, and the Regions and the State.” COST. (Italy), reprinted 
in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 25 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., Oceana Publications, 
Inc. 2003). The original text, instead, stated the “the Republic is divided into Regions, Provinces and 
Municipalities.” MAURO CAPPELLETTI ET AL., THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 306 (Stanford Univ. Press 
1967). In addition, the second paragraph of Article 114 now extends to provinces, metropolitan cities 
and municipalities the legal status previously accorded only to regions by the repealed Article 115. 
Compare id. with COST. (Italy), supra. Accordingly, these entities share with the regions the same 
nature of autonomy with regard to their home rules and constitutionally entrenched powers and 
functions. Indeed, they are “autonomous entities with their own statutes, powers and functions in 
accordance with the principles established in the Constitution.” COST. art. 114 (Italy). 
 26. Article 118 provides:  
The administrative functions are attributed to the Municipalities, save these which, for 
assuring a uniform exercise, shall be conferred to the Provinces, the Metropolitan Cities, the 
Regions and the State, on the basis of subsidiarity, differentiation and adequacy. 
 The Municipalities, the Provinces and the Metropolitan Cities are the title holders of their 
own administrative functions and of those conferred by State or regional law, to their 
respective competences. 
 The State law shall specify the forms of coordination between the State and the Regions 
in the matters referred to in letters b) and h) of the second paragraph of Article 117, and 
specifies other forms of agreement and coordination in the matter of the protection of the 
cultural heritage. 
COST. art 118 (Italy).  
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Article 118 recognizes subsidiarity as a keystone of the right of self-
government.27 Accordingly, power is assigned “to the lowest practicable 
tier of social organization, public or private.”28 The principle of 
subsidiarity calls for a flexible and dynamic distribution of powers. 
Powers should be assigned  based on the local/non-local dimension of the 
collective interest and on the capability of the specific government to 
fulfill that interest. Therefore, an extensive degree of inter-local 
cooperation is required in order to reach the optimal dimension of delivery 
of several local services. 
In my view, the principle of differentiation creates the right of local 
authorities to select the public responsibilities and services they provide to 
actual and potential residents.29 This principle also recognizes the right of 
localities to choose how to discharge their duties.30 But above all, 
 
 
 27. Article 118 also recognizes the principle of “horizontal subsidiarity,” pursuant to which all 
public authorities “shall favor the autonomous initiative of the citizens activity of general interest on 
the basis of the principle of subsidiarity.” Id. 
 28. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is Federalism Good for Localism? The Localist Case for Federal 
Regimes, 21 J. L. & POL. 187, 190 (2005). 
 29. This view does not match the opinion of the majority of current scholarship. Most scholars 
either read the principles of differentiation and adequacy as hendiadys or disregard the importance of 
the principle of differentiation. See, e.g., Tania Groppi & Nicoletta Scattone, Italy: The Subsidiarity 
Principle, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 131 (2006); Beniamino Caravita Di Toritto, Constitutional Reform: 
Local Government and the Recent Changes to Intergovernmental Relations in Italy, in THE PLACE 
AND ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS 149 (Nico Steytler ed., Konrad-Adenquer-
Stiftung 2005); Peter Leyland et al., Regional Government Reform in Italy: Assessing the Prospects for 
Devolution, 2002 PUB. L. 242–51 (2002). 
 30. Article 117 provides that the Italian State has exclusive legislative competence in matters of 
“electoral legislation, organs of government and fundamental functions of Municipalities, Provinces 
and Metropolitan Cities.” COST. art 117 (Italy). Additionally, there are some services that any local 
government must provide to constituents in order to guarantee equal and uniform conditions of 
citizenship. This calls for a nationwide common denominator for public service delivery. The Italian 
Constitution also entrusts the central government with the legislative power to determine “the essential 
levels of well-being concerning civil and social rights which must be guaranteed on the entire national 
territory.” Id. Regions may decide to assign additional tasks. Central and regional governments 
transfer to local governments the necessary economic resources for this purpose. In addition, each 
local government has the power to decide whether to provide additional services and how to organize 
the distribution of such services. To this end, Article 119 establishes that 
municipalities, the Provinces, the Metropolitan Cities and the Regions have financial 
autonomy of revenues and expenditures.  
 Municipalities, the Provinces, the Metropolitan Cities and the Regions have autonomous 
resources. They establish and apply their own taxes and revenues in harmony with the 
Constitution and according to the coordination with the principles of public finances and the 
tax system. They receive a share of the joint participation (comparticipazione) from the 
proceeds of the state taxes that are related to their territory. 
 The law of the State shall establish an equalization fund (fondo perequativo) without 
restrictions as to their destination, for (the benefit of) the territories with lesser fiscal capacity 
per inhabitant. 
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differentiation favors the right of local governments to politically and 
economically distinguish themselves in their mission to foster local 
development. 
In this last regard, the 2001 reform indeed strengthened the regulatory 
powers and organizational autonomy of local authorities. Localities have 
been vested with the power to enact regulations relating to “the 
organization and the development of the functions attributed to them.”31 
Thus, both national and regional laws detail what services will be provided 
and how local administrative functions will be exercised. A clear ruling 
from the Constitutional Court on this issue is still missing. States and 
regions should grasp the potential of these principles and promote 
competition and cooperation among municipalities at the local level. And, 
unfortunately, after more than five years, there has been little effort to 
implement the new constitutional principles recognizing local 
governments’ full-fledged status as autonomous entities.  
B. Local Public Entrepreneurship in the Italian Legislation on Local 
Government 
The Local Government Act of 2000 defines the legal status of local 
governments within the Italian governmental framework.32 
Notwithstanding the recent constitutional reform, there have been minimal 
changes to this law. 
Articles 3, 13, 112 and 113 are of prominent relevance. Articles 3 and 
13 set forth the general scope of local government autonomy and require 
safeguards for local interests, as well as promotion of social and economic 
 
 
 The resources that are derived from the sources referred to in the previous paragraphs, 
are to enable the Municipalities, Provinces, the Metropolitan Cities and Regions to finance 
integrally the public functions attributed to them. 
 In order to promote economic development, the social cohesion and the social solidarity, 
to remove the economic and social inequalities (squilibri), to promote the effective exercise 
of human rights (dirritti della persona), or to pursue goals diverse from the normal exercise 
of their functions, the State allocates (destina) additional (aggiuntive) resources and effects 
special interventions in favor of specific Municipalities, Provinces, metropolitan Cities and 
Regions. 
 The Municipalities, Provinces, Metropolitan Cities and Regions have their own 
partimony, attributed according to the general principles, determined by State law. They may 
incur indebtedness only in order to finance expenditures for investment. Any guarantee by the 
State for such loans is excluded. 
Id. art 119. 
 31. CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 25, at 27. 
 32. Legislative Decree 267/2000 (Aug. 18, 2000); GAZZ. UFF. 277 (ordinary supplement) (Sept. 
28, 2000). 
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development in local communities.33 In particular, under Article 112, local 
governments are to provide “public services having as their object the 
production of goods and activities aiming at fulfilling social ends and to 
promote the civic and economic development of local communities.”34 
Article 113(5) provides that local public services of economic 
relevance, such as the operation and maintenance of methane gas, electric 
power, water distribution networks, public transportation networks and 
sanitation, are be provided alternatively through: (a) a limited liability 
company selected through a competitive tendering procedure; (b) a limited 
liability company held jointly by the local government and a private 
partner selected through a competitive tendering procedures in compliance 
with national and EU competition law and in accordance with the the 
guidelines enacted by the competent regulatory authorities; or (c) a wholly 
public-owned limited liability company, provided that “the local authority 
exercises over the person concerned a control which is similar to that 
which it exercises over its own departments and, at the same time, that 
person carries out the essential part of its activities with the controlling 
local authority or authorities.”35 Overall, this legislation allows self-
determination in the selection of local public goods and services as well as 
in the organization of services. 
V. THE EUROPEAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Decentralization is a common denominator connecting several 
European countries. This focus on decentralization explains the attention 
paid to local government involvement in the European supranational 
context and in the ongoing discussion on EU governance reform. There 
appears to be a trend towards the promotion of local self-government and 
local public entrepreneurship. 
A. The Role of Sub-State Bodies in the European Charter of Local Self-
Government 
The Council of Europe first recognized the basic concept of local 
actors in 1961, when it gave permanent status to the European Conference 
of Local Authorities. The Charter of this Conference was amended in 1975 
 
 
 33. Id. arts. 3, 31. 
 34. Id. art. 112. 
 35. Id. art. 113(5). 
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to define a “region” as a political entity.36 The Conference’s working 
sessions led to the European Charter of Local Self-Government (European 
Charter)37 and the Draft Charter of Regional Self-Government.38 
Article 2 of the European Charter provides the basic legal foundation 
for local self-government. Under the European Charter, “local self-
government shall be recognised in domestic legislation, and where 
practicable in the constitution.”39 This right to local self-government 
“denotes the right and the ability of local authorities, within the limits of 
the law, to regulate and manage a substantial share of public affairs under 
their own responsibility and in the interests of the local population.”40 
The European Charter specifies that the constitution or statutes of 
Member States should prescribe “basic powers and responsibilities of local 
authorities.”41 Beyond the basic constitutionally entrenched powers, the 
European Charter recognizes the right of local authorities to self-
determination and to differentiate themselves from neighboring localities. 
Indeed, local authorities have “full discretion to exercise their initiative 
with regard to any matter which is not excluded from their competence nor 
assigned to any other authority.”42 Moreover, “[p]ublic responsibilities 
shall generally be exercised, in preference, by those authorities which are 
closest to the citizen. Allocation of responsibility to another authority 
should weigh up the extent and nature of the task and requirements of 
efficiency and economy.”43 And, with regard to powers delegated by a 
 
 
 36. Resolution 61/20 of the Comm. of Ministers, Sept. 13, 1961 (Council of Eur.). Regions were 
added as members in 1975 by Resolution 75/4 of Feb. 19, 1975 (Council of Eur.). These resolutions 
are available at http://www.coe.int/T/CM/WCD/advSearch_en.asp#. 
 37. European Charter of Local Self-Government, opened for signature Oct. 15, 1985, Europ. T.S. 
No. 122, available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=122&CL= 
ENG [hereinafter Charter of Local Self-Government]. 
 38. Draft European Charter of Regional Self-Government, June 5, 1997, available at 
www.ena.lu/Europe/council-europe/European-charter-regional-self-government-1997.htm. At least 
equal attention should go to the Assembly of European Regions, the purpose of which, under Chapter 
I, Article 1, para. 3 of its Statute, is  
[t]o promote the institutional participation of the Regions in decision making processes and in 
order to do this increase their active role in the construction of Europe, especially in the work 
of the Council of Europe, of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and of 
the European Union.  
Statute of the Assembly of European Regions, June 14, 1985, available at http://www.a-e-r.org/ 
fileadmin/user_upload/GoverningBodies/GeneralAssembly/Statutes/Statutes-200x/EN-statuts_naples 
2002.pdf. 
 39. Charter of Local Self-Government, supra note 37, art. 2. 
 40. Id. art. 3 (emphasis added). 
 41. Id. art. 4. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id.  
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central or regional authority, “local authorities shall, insofar as possible, be 
allowed discretion in adapting their exercise to local conditions.”44 
Local governments are also given the right to determine the 
organizational means best suited to accomplish their goals: “local 
authorities shall be able to determine their own internal administrative 
structures in order to adapt them to local needs and ensure effective 
management.”45 In addition, under Article 10 local governments can 
choose, “in exercising their powers, to co-operate and, within the 
framework of the law, to form consortia with other local authorities in 
order to carry out tasks of common interest.”46 On a more international 
level, the European Charter specifies that local governments be able “to 
co-operate with their counterparts in other States.”47 
The European Charter includes principles regarding the administrative 
supervision of local authorities and, in particular, ensures that “the 
intervention of the controlling authority is kept in proportion to the 
importance of the interests which it is intended to protect.”48 In addition, 
the European Charter also promotes the financial autonomy of local 
authorities. Pursuant to Article 9, local governments shall have 
adequate financial resources of their own, of which they may 
dispose freely within the framework of their powers. Local 
authorities’ financial resources shall be commensurate with the 
responsibilities provided for by the constitution and the law. Part at 
least of the financial resources of local authorities shall derive from 
local taxes and charges of which, within the limits of statute, they 
have the power to determine the rate.49 
Finally, local authorities have “the right of recourse to a judicial remedy in 
order to secure free exercise of their powers and respect for such principles 
of local self-government as are enshrined in the constitution or domestic 
legislation.”50 
 
 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. art. 6. 
 46. Id. art. 10. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. art. 8. 
 49. Id. art. 9. 
 50. Id. art. 11. 
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B. The Role of Sub-State Bodies in EU Primary Law and EU Secondary 
Legislation and the Role of Regional and Local Governments in EU 
Soft Law and Policy Guidelines 
Initially, local and regional authorities were completely cut out of the 
European integration process. This neglect stems from the absence of any 
reference to local actors in the European Community (E.C.) Treaties. On 
the E.C. secondary law level, the creation of the Consultative Council of 
Regional and Local Authorities (the Council) was an initial step towards 
the involvement of local governments in the EU decision-making process. 
In its directive creating the Council, the European Commission (the 
Commission) stated that it was necessary for regional and local authorities 
to become active “in the formulation and implementation of EU regional 
policy.”51 The goal was to create a decision-making body at the sub-state 
levels which had only consultative powers52 and was to meet only when 
convened by the Commission itself.53 
This Council represented the keystone of decentralization in EU 
governance. It eventually grew into the Committee of the Regions, as 
established in the Treaty on European Union.54 However, despite the 
progress made in the Treaty of Amsterdam55 and in the Treaty of Nice,56 
the Committee of the Regions remains a mere consultative body. 
Nevertheless, the Commission has been a strong proponent of the 
decentralization of European governance structure. With its issuance of the 
White Paper on European Governance,57 the Commission committed 
itself to: (a) establishing “a stronger interaction with regional and local 
governments and civil society [through] a more systematic dialogue with 
representatives of regional and local governments through national and 
 
 
 51. Comm’n Decision 88/487/EEC, Setting Up a Consultative Council of Regional and Local 
Authorities, dt pmbl., 1988 O.J. (L 247) 23. 
 52. Id. art. 1. 
 53. Id. art. 7. 
 54. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1 [hereinafter Treaty on 
European Union]. 
 55. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the 
European Communities and Certain Related Acts, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of 
Amsterdam]. The Treaty of Amsterdam granted to the Committee of the Regions the ability to adopt 
its Rules of Procedure, an increase in the number of areas in which consultation is mandatory, the right 
to issue opinions on its own initiative, and the right of the European Parliament to seek its opinion. See 
E.C. Treaty, infra note 73, arts. 71, 128, 137, 175, 264, 275. 
 56. The Nice Treaty introduced two main amendments: members of the Committee must have a 
regional or local electoral mandate, and members cannot exceed 350. See E.C. Treaty, infra note 73, 
art. 263. 
 57. Commission White Paper on European Governance, COM (2001) 428 final (July 25, 2001). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
228 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 7:215 
 
 
 
 
European associations at an early stage in shaping policy;”58 and (b) 
bringing “more flexibility in the means provided for implementing 
legislation and programmes with a strong territorial impact” through 
target-based contracts between member states, territorial authorities, and 
the Commission.59  
In order to realize these commitments, the Commission adopted the 
Report Dialogue with Associations of Regional and Local Authorities on 
the Formulation of European Union Policy, which strengthened “the 
framework, goals and modalities governing this dialogue with associations 
of regional and local authorities,”60 and A Framework for Target-Based 
Tripartite Contracts and Agreements Between the Community, the States 
and Regional and Local Authorities.”61 According to this latter report, 
contracts are to be awarded to sub-national authorities within the Member 
States in order to realize particular objectives defined in “primary” 
legislation.62 Such contracts should include arrangements for monitoring.63 
In addition, the Commission recently introduced a new governance 
mechanism that tends to foster the connection between the EU and the 
national and local governments. This new approach is called the “open 
method of coordination” (OMC) and it serves as a general model in 
several policy areas.64  
Finally, decentralization was a primary focus of the proposed EU 
Constitution.65 This document included a number of important features 
relating to regional and local governments. In summary, these features 
included: 
 
 
 58. Id. at 4. 
 59. Id. at 13. 
 60. Eur. Comm’n, Dialogue with Associations of Regional and Local Authorities on the 
Formulation of European Union Policy, COM (2003) 811 final (Dec. 19, 2003), available at 
http://www.cor.europa.eu/document/activities/com2003_0811en01.pdf. 
 61. Eur. Comm’n, A Framework for Target-Based Tripartite Contracts and Agreements Between 
the Community, the States and Regional and Local Authorities, COM (2002) 709 final (Dec. 11, 
2002), available at http://ec.europa.eu/governance/docs/comm_contrat_en.pdf. 
 62. Id. at 2. 
 63. Id. at 3–4. 
 64. See, e.g., Eur. Comm’n, Modernising Social Protection for the Development of High-Quality, 
Accessible and Sustainable Health Care and Long-Term Care: Support for the National Strategies 
Using the “Open Method of Coordination”, COM (2004) 304 final (Apr. 20, 2004). See generally 
Susana Borrás & Kerstin Jacobsson, The Open Method of Coordination and New Governance Patterns 
in the EU, 11 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 185 (2004); Sabrina Regent, The Open Method of Coordination: A 
New Supranational Form of Governance?, 9 EUR. L.J. 190 (2003). 
 65. Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 OJ (C 310) 1. 
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• the explicit recognition of local and regional self-government;66 
• the extension of the subsidiarity principle to include local and 
regional government;67 
• the extension of the concept of cohesion to include territorial 
cohesion;68 
• safeguarding the prerogatives of the Committee of the Regions;69 
• monitoring of the subsidiarity/proportionality system;70 
• increased consultation with regional and local governments, and 
more awareness of the financial impact of EU policies on local 
and regional governments;71 and 
• the right of the Committee of the Regions to refer subsidiarity 
issues to the E.C.J.72 
If implemented, these aspects of the proposed EU Constitution would 
strengthen the principle of multi-level governance and make it easier for 
citizens to engage in European policies, thus ensuring that EU priorities 
better reflect citizens’ everyday concerns. 
C. The Law on Standing of Sub-State Bodies to Bring an Action Before the 
E.C.J.  
The legal status of sub-state bodies within the EU may have interesting 
implications for the determination of whether local governments have 
standing before the E.C.J. Such a right would increase the recognition of 
local governments within the EU framework. However, currently, the legal 
status of sub-national bodies in annulment proceedings before the E.C.J. 
remains in doubt. 
According to some scholars, in the absence of an express definition of 
“State” in the EU treaties—especially for the purpose of Article 230 of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community (E.C. Treaty)73—“State” 
 
 
 66. Id. art. I-5. 
 67. Id. art. I-11. 
 68. Id. art. I-3. 
 69. Id. art. III-365. 
 70. Id. at Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id.  
 73. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002, 
2002 O.J. (C 325), available at http://www.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002E/pdf/1200ZE_EN.pdf 
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should be interpreted as referring to entities with the capacity to sign and 
ratify agreements between States that have some sort of independent 
power on a territorial basis.74 By contrast, others infer from E.C.J. case law 
that the term “State” embodies a collection of authorities and tasks.75 This 
scholarly debate adds little to the interpretation of the second paragraph of 
Article 230.  
Unfortunately, the E.C.J. has provided little guidance on this issue.76 In 
two of its orders, the E.C.J. declared the actions for annulment brought by 
the Région Wallonne77 and the Regione Toscana78 as manifestly 
inadmissible. The wording of both orders is almost identical:  
it is clear from the general scheme of the Treaties that the term 
“Member State,” for the purposes of the institutional provisions and, 
in particular, those relating to proceedings before the courts, refers 
only to government authorities of the Member States of the 
European Communities and cannot include the governments of 
regions or of autonomous communities, irrespective of the powers 
they may have.79 
Without citing to the E.C. Treaty itself, the E.C.J. confirmed that the 
second and third paragraphs of Article 230 cannot be applied by analogy 
to the regions.80  
However, in matters other than direct actions, the E.C.J. has often 
widened the scope of the term “State” to include any body, whatever its 
legal form, responsible for providing a public service and, for that 
purpose, has special powers beyond those given by the rules applicable in 
 
 
[hereinafter E.C. Treaty]. 
 74. Manuel Pérez González, La subjetividad internacional, in INSTITUCIONES DE DERECHO 
INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO 219 (Manuel Díez de Velasco Vallejo ed., Tecnos 2001). 
 75. Maryvonne Hecquard-Theron, La notion d’État en droit communautaire, 26 REV. 
TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUR. 693 (1990). 
 76. It is argued that there is still no formal judgment to support that case law. However, such 
procedural rigor seems unconvincing given that pleas of inadmissibility, and in particular manifest 
inadmissibility, are usually disposed of by way of an order, in accordance with Article 92(1) of the 
Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice. Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, art. 92(1), 1991 
O.J. (L 176). The same is true of questions referred for a preliminary ruling, “where the answer admits 
of no reasonable doubt.” Id. art. 104(3). 
 77. Case C-95/97, Région Wallonne v. Comm’n, 1997 E.C.R. I-1787 [hereinafter Région 
Wallonne]. 
 78. Case C-180/97, Regione Toscana v. Comm’n, 1997 E.C.R. I-5245 [hereinafter Regione 
Toscana]. 
 79. See Région Wallonne, supra note 77, at I-1787–88; Regione Toscana, supra note 78, at I-
5245–46. 
 80. See also Case C-452/98, Nederlandse Antillen v. Council of the Eur. Union, 2001 E.C.R. I-
8973 [hereinafter Nederlandse]. 
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relations between individuals.81 The elasticity of the term “State” in the 
E.C.J.’s case law is also manifested by the use of that term in cases 
involving the failure of member states to fulfill their obligations under EU 
law. For example, Spain was found in breach of its obligations when local 
and regional bodies were actually to blame for the breach.82 Thus, if a 
regional or local authority fails to fulfill its obligations under EU law, the 
Member State in which that authority is located has been held liable.  
Further broadening the definition of “State,” the E.C.J. has 
incorporated that term into the meaning of “public authority” when 
applying Article 39(4) of the E.C. Treaty.83 The E.C.J. held that 
employment in the public service includes all offices “which involve 
direct or indirect participation in the exercise of powers conferred by 
public law and in the discharge of functions whose purpose is to safeguard 
the general interests of the State or of other public authorities.”84 The 
concept of “public authorities” encompasses “State” as well as sub-state 
bodies. In making its determination, the E.C.J. followed a variable 
approach which adapted the concept of “State” in order to guarantee the 
effectiveness of EU law and maximize the integration process.  
However, the E.C.J. has not extended a similar interpretation to 
provisions relating to the distribution of powers within the EU, as held in 
Regione Toscana: 
If the contrary were true [if sub-state bodies had standing to bring 
an action of their own right], it would undermine the institutional 
balance provided for by the Treaties, which determine, inter alia, the 
conditions under which the Member States, that is to say the States 
party to the Treaties establishing the Communities and the 
Accession Treaties, participate in the functioning of the Community 
institutions. It is not possible for the European Communities to 
 
 
 81. See Case C-188/89, A. Foster and Others v. British Gas, 1990 E.C.R. I-3313. The European 
Court of Justice (E.C.J.) pointed out that it previously held that provisions of a directive could be used 
against tax authorities (Case C-8/81, Ursula Becker v. Finanzamt Münster-Innanstadt, 1982 E.C.R. I-
53); local authorities (Case C-103/88, Fratelli Costanzo SpA v. Comune di Milano, 1989 E.C.R. I-
1839); constitutionally independent authorities responsible for the maintenance of public order and 
safety (Case C-222/84, Marguerite Johnston v. Chief, Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 
1986 E.C.R. I-1651); and public authorities providing public health services (Case C-152/84, M. 
Marshall v. Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority, 1986 E.C.R. I-723). 
 82. See Case C-355/90, Comm’n v. Spain, 1993 E.C.R. I-4221, I-4271; Case C-417/99, Comm’n 
v. Spain, 2001 E.C.R. I-6015, I-6025; Case C-499/99, Comm’n v. Spain, 2002 E.C.R. I-6031, I-6056. 
 83. E.C. Treaty, supra note 73, art. 39(4). 
 84. Case C-66/85, Deborah Lawrie Blum v. Land Baden-Württemberg, 1986 E.C.R. 2121, 2147 
(emphasis added). 
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comprise a greater number of Member States than the number of 
States between which they were established.85 
There has not been sufficient development of the legal status of local 
authorities to justify shifting the institutional balance discussed in Région 
Wallonne and Regione Toscana. For this reason, the E.C.J. recently 
confirmed this prior case law in its Regione Siciliana decision.86 
D. The EU Framework for Local Public Entrepreneurship 
Local governments have always been indirectly involved in the 
implementation of EU structural policies and directly involved in 
enforcing EU sectoral policies. In this latter framework, the Commission 
recently adopted a report entitled Cohesion Policy and Cities: The Urban 
Contribution to Growth and Jobs in the Regions,87 which promotes local 
public entrepreneurship and encourages participation in global 
competition. 
The Commission first acknowledged that “European cities attract 
investment and jobs.”88 The proposals of the Commission regarding 
cohesion policy suggested that cities should use the “many tools at their 
disposal to strengthen their attractiveness.”89 According to the 
Commission, local governments should intervene in four key sectors: 
“transport, accessibility and mobility;90 access to services and amenities;91 
 
 
 85. Regione Toscana, supra note 78, at I-5246. Almost identical wording is found in Wallonne, 
supra note 77, at I-1788. 
 86. Case C-417/04, Regione Siciliana v. Comm’n, 2006 E.C.R. I-3881. The E.C.J. ruled that  
an action by a local or regional entity cannot be treated in the same way as an action by a 
Member State, the term Member State within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 
230 EC referring only to government authorities of the Member States. That term cannot 
include the governments of regions or other local authorities within Member States without 
undermining the institutional balance provided for by the Treaty. 
 87. Eur. Comm’n, Cohesion Policy and Cities: The Urban Contribution to Growth and Jobs in 
the Regions, COM (2006) 385 final (July 13, 2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/ 
consultation/urban/com_2006_0385_en.pdf [hereinafter Communication on Cohesion Policy and 
Cities]. 
 88. Id. at 4. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. at 5. “Sustainable urban mobility means making the best use of all the transport 
infrastructure, co-ordination between the various transport modes and the promotion of the least 
polluting modes.” Id. 
 91. Id. “A competitive city needs to invest in modern, efficient and affordable services with easy 
online access. Key services include healthcare, social services, training and public administration. 
These services must develop and adapt to current and future demographic changes, especially the 
aging population.” Id.  
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the natural and physical environment;92 [and] the cultural sector.”93  
In the Commission’s view, cities should support local economies by 
providing “a stimulating environment for innovation and businesses to 
flourish.”94 City-level actions have an added value because cities “have 
more information on the specificities of the business environment and are 
able to carry out smaller scale complex actions tackling multiple 
interlinked problems.”95 The Commission suggested two methods for 
promoting local economic growth: (a) actions taken for the establishment 
of new enterprises;96 and (b) actions relating to innovation and the 
knowledge economy.97 These proposals may induce local governments to 
step into the economic arena and even enter into partnerships with private 
actors or other public entities. 
In terms of governance, the Commission encouraged “flexible co-
operation between the different territorial levels.”98 According to the 
report, “[c]ities must find forms of governance which respect the 
institutional organisation of each Member State and which are able to 
manage all aspects of urban development.”99 The Commission set forth 
several guidelines. First, partnerships should be developed “between cities, 
 
 
 92. Id. “Rehabilitation of derelict brownfield sites and renovation of public spaces . . . improves 
local services and the local area, as well as avoiding the use of greenfield sites.” Id. at 6. 
 93. Id. at 5. “An active cultural policy is a valuable tool for building bridges between 
communities and fostering the integration of immigrants and other newcomers to the city.” Id. at 7. 
 94. Id. at 7. 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. To promote business initiatives at the local level, local governments are required to 
improve their economic infrastructure. This requires “[p]roviding advice and support services to 
business, including social enterprises” as well as providing “assistance in the adoption and efficient 
use of new technologies, science parks, ICT [Information and Communication Technologies] 
communication centers and incubators. It also includes support and coaching in the areas of 
management, marketing, technical support, recruitment, and other professional and commercial 
services.” Also, local governments should work to build networks of “cooperation between local 
partners—including business, trade unions, universities, NGOs [non-governmental organizations], 
training institutes and the local community.” These support networks would assist in creating “[n]ew 
mechanisms for sharing knowledge and experience.” The financial aspects are, of course, particularly 
relevant.  
[P]artnerships between local authorities, funders, service providers and SMEs [small and 
medium sized enterprises] facilitate the bringing together of financial and non-financial 
instruments, to meet local needs. Packages may consist of grants; micro credit schemes; 
guarantee funds for sharing high risks; mezzanine funds, advice and training.  
Id.  
 97. Id. “Cities should attract and retain knowledge workers and, more generally, an important 
share of tertiary educated residents. A key input to choice is the attractiveness of a city in terms of 
transport, services, environment and culture.” Id. Furthermore, cities can “stimulate and co-ordinate 
partnerships and clusters of excellence with universities and other institutions of higher education, 
creating business incubators, joint ventures and science parks.” Id. at 7–8. 
 98. Id. at 11. 
 99. Id.  
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regions and the state, within the framework of an integrated and coherent 
approach to urban development.”100 Also, cities should address the 
challenge of global competition by creating “strategies co-ordinated at the 
level of agglomerations or urban networks in order to achieve critical 
mass.”101 Particularly, the Commission hoped to promote “co-ordination 
between urban authorities (both central and suburban) on the one hand and 
rural and regional authorities on the other.”102 
In addressing urban economic growth, the Commission emphasized 
that “urban development is a complex and long term process.”103 
Therefore, cities should maximize all the key factors for this development 
by adopting a long term, integrated perspective.104 Towards this goal, 
cities should enact economic measures that are “sustainable in social and 
environmental terms. Monitoring and evaluation systems should be in 
place to verify results on the ground.”105 Finally, localities should include 
all key partners—“the private sector, the community and NGOs [non-
governmental organizations], as well as local, regional and national 
government”—in planning, implementing and evaluating urban 
development.106 
Regarding financing, beyond EU Structural Funds urban development 
may be supported through private resources.  
Private financing is useful and often necessary to complement 
public resources. A clear legal framework must underpin the setting 
up of public-private partnerships. The private sector brings not just 
money but complementary skills and competences. An effective 
public-private partnership requires both a strategic and long term 
vision and technical and management competences on the part of 
local authorities.107 
 
 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. Such co-ordination is important because  
urban areas provide a service to the wider region in terms of employment, public services, 
public spaces, social centres, sport and cultural facilities; and because in a similar way, rural 
areas provide services to wider society through the provision of rural amenities, recreational 
opportunities and environmental goods as reservoirs of natural resources and highly valued 
landscapes.  
Id.  
 103. Id.  
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. at 12. 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. at 13. 
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Local public entrepreneurship is also recognized in the Commission’s 
soft law regarding services of general economic interest. The Commission 
seems to leave wide discretion to local governments regarding what 
services are offered to constituents and how those services are provided. 
“However, providers of services of general economic interest, including 
in-house service providers, are undertakings and therefore subject to the 
competition rules of the E.C. Treaty.”108 Nevertheless, Member States 
have increasingly used “public-private schemes, including design-build-
finance-operate contracts, concessions and the creation of mixed-economy 
companies to ensure the delivery of infrastructure projects or services of 
general interest.”109 
In addition, with its Green Paper on Public-Private Partnerships and 
Community Law on Public Contracts and Concessions, the Commission 
sought to “launch a debate on the application of Community law on public 
contracts and concessions to the PPP [public-private partnership] 
phenomenon.”110 The Commission clarified that it was not attempting “to 
make a value judgement regarding the decision to externalize the 
management of public services or not.” Such a decision should remain 
“squarely within the competence of public authorities. Indeed, Community 
law on public contracts and concessions is neutral as regards the choice 
exercised by Member States to provide a public service themselves or to 
entrust it to a third party.”111 Quite similarly, Directive 2006/123 of the 
European Council states that its provisions should not be read to “oblige 
Member States either to liberalise services of general economic interest or 
to privatise public entities which provide such services or to abolish 
existing monopolies for other activities or certain distribution services.”112 
Thus, the Directive “does not deal with the liberalisation of services of 
 
 
 108. Eur. Comm’n, White Paper on Services of General Interest, COM (2004) 374 final (May 12, 
2004), at 15, available at http://eur-6x.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2004/com2004_0374eng01. 
pdf. 
 109. In particular, according to the White Paper 
Member States have a wide margin to decide how to organize services of general interest. In 
the absence of Community harmonization, the relevant public authorities in the Member 
States are in principle free to decide whether to provide a service of general interest 
themselves or whether to entrust its provision to another (public or private) entity. 
Id. at 15. 
 110. Eur. Comm’n, Green Paper on Public-Private Partnerships and Community Law on Public 
Contracts and Concessions 7, COM (2004) 327 final (Apr. 30, 2004), available at http://eur-lex. 
europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2004/com2004_0327en01.pdf. 
 111. Id.  
 112. Council Directive 2006/123/EC, ¶ 8, 2006 O.J. (L 376). 
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general economic interest, reserved to public or private entities, nor with 
the privatisation of public entities providing services.”113 
The position of the Commission primarily relies on principles of EU 
primary law. For example, Article 295 of the E.C. Treaty establishes a 
position of neutrality regarding public versus private ownership.114 In 
addition, Article 86 states that undertakings 
entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest 
or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly [are] 
subject to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to the rules 
on competition, [but only] in so far as the application of such rules 
does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular 
tasks assigned to them.115 
VI. THE U.S. LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND DOCTRINE 
When defining the right to local self-government within the U.S. legal 
framework, one cannot start without integrating this discussion into the 
broader framework of American federalism. At the outset, I briefly 
summarize the characteristics of U.S. federalist institutional design. In 
doing so, I adhere to Roderick Hills’s characterization of American 
federalism. According to Hills, “‘federalism’ is the body of legal rules 
protecting the power of ‘regional’, sub-national governments.”116   Hills 
asserts that regional governments have three defining characteristics: (1) 
they possess a “general power to collect taxes and expend revenue;” (2) 
they have “general regulatory power to govern territory containing several 
local governments;” and (3) they “define those local governmental powers 
through the regional laws.”117 Hills draws a parallel between the individual 
 
 
 113. Id. art. 1, ¶ 2. 
 114. “This Treaty law shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system 
of property ownership.” E.C. Treaty, supra note 73, art. 295. 
 115. Id. art. 86. Article 16 of the E.C. Treaty is also relevant: 
Without prejudice to Articles 73, 86 and 87, and given the place occupied by services of 
general economic interest in the shared values of the Union as well as their role in promoting 
social and territorial cohesion, the Community and the Member States, each within their 
respective powers and within the scope of application of this Treaty, shall take care that such 
services operate on the basis of principles and conditions which enable them to fulfill their 
missions. 
Id. art. 16. 
 116. Hills, supra note 28, at 196. 
 117. Id. “‘Local governments’ are the atom of the system, for their laws do not define or control 
the powers of any ‘general purpose’ governments smaller than themselves, although their territory may 
encompass other, smaller local governments, as counties’ territory (for instance) encompasses 
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and collective right to self-government, concluding that: 
“[d]ecentralization is the backbone of self-government, both individual 
and collective. . . . Thus, collective self-government is simply the natural 
extension of the concept of individual rights.”118 
However, aside from Hills’s suggestive and agreeable parallelism 
construing the right to local self government as an “‘inherent’ right of 
group association,”119 American legal scholarship seems profoundly 
divided on the actual legal status of local governments within the U.S. 
institutional framework. For some scholars, the city is a powerless creature 
of the state.120 Others object that this view ignores empirical evidence 
depicting the city as “a complex local polity, entitled to self-governance 
and capable of supporting a local political system” and ultimately “a state 
in microcosm.”121 
According to Richard Briffault, the difference between these two theses 
can be understood in light of the coexistence of Dillon’s Rule122 and home 
 
 
municipalities.” Id. As to the foundations of the right of local self-government, Hills recalls Abraham 
Lincoln’s speech on the Kansas-Nebraska Act: 
I trust I understand, and truly estimate the right of self-government. My faith in the 
proposition that each man should do precisely as he pleases with all which is exclusively his 
own, lies at the foundation of the sense of justice there is in me. I extend the principles to 
communities of men, as well as to individuals. I so extend it, because it is politically wise, as 
well as naturally just: politically wise, in saving us from broils about matters which do not 
concern us.  
Id. at 189–90. 
 118. Hills, supra note 28, at 190–91 (“In short, there is no difference in principle between the 
considerations that justify collective individual self-government [. . .] [d]ecentralization serves the goal 
of self-government, whether the ‘self’ doing the governing is an individual, the members of a private 
organization, or the population of a local jurisdiction.”). 
 119. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Romancing the Town: Why We (Still) Need a Democratic Defense of 
City Power, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2009, 2017 (2000). 
 120. See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1059 (1980); 
Gerald E. Frug, Property and Power: Hartog on the Legal History of New York City, 1984 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 673, 687–90 (1985). 
 121. Briffault, supra note 5, at 391–92. 
 122. A reader who is not familiar with U.S. local government law may appreciate a definition of 
these two concepts. In his Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations, John Forrest Dillon 
explained that while the powers of states exist except for express restrictions under the state or federal 
constitution, municipalities have only the powers that are expressly granted to them. JOHN F. DILLON, 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 101–02 (James Cockcroft & Company 1872). 
Thus “Dillon’s Rule” states that municipal governments only have the powers that are expressly 
granted to them by the state legislature, those that are necessarily implied from that grant of power, 
and those that are essential to the municipality’s existence and functioning. Id. at 102. Any ambiguities 
in the legislative grant of power should be resolved against the municipality so that its powers are 
narrowly construed. Id. However, when the state has not specifically directed the method by which the 
municipality may implement its granted power, the municipality has the discretion to choose the 
method so long as its choice is reasonable. Id.  
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rule,123 which reflect the tension between differing perceptions of local 
governments. According to the former, the city is “a complex local polity, 
entitled to self-governance and capable of supporting a local political 
system.” But according to the latter, the city is an “administrative arm of 
the state, and as such both a potential threat to individual liberty and a 
hierarchically subordinate institution subject to state control.”124  
There is still debate about the proper scope of local autonomy. The 
legal discourse divides into two factions. 
The two arguments emphasize different fundamental values: 
participation in public life in the one and efficiency in the provision 
of public sector goods and services in the other. Similarly, the 
theories rely on contrasting metaphors for the central mechanism of 
local public life: “voice” in the one case and “exit” in the other.125 
Yet the two tales told by political and economic theorists share a 
common commitment to localism.126 
These two separate traditions, although reliant on distinctive premises, 
converge on the general contention that local autonomy is the superior 
value in need of protection. Notably, a common denominator ties together 
the political and economic schools of thought: local public 
entrepreneurship.  
Frug, the most prominent among participation theorists, suggests that 
local governments’ power should be enhanced so that they have the ability 
to, for example, operate banks, insurance companies, and other financial 
institutions, provide housing, create food cooperatives, and run for-profit 
 
 
 123. The “home rule” concept has been described as so: 
Under governing principles of law, political subdivisions of a state cannot engage in any 
activity unless they have received explicit authority from the state legislature. The only 
exception to this rule exists where a locality has received “home rule” power either in the 
state constitution or from the state legislature. A locality that possesses “home rule” may 
initiate legislative programs without prior approval from the legislature. It seems relatively 
clear that the decision to contract with private firms for the provision of a particular good or 
service would be subject to this rule of plenary state power. Thus, a locality that desired to 
privatize one or more of its functions would presumably have to receive explicit authority to 
do so or would have to possess “home rule” power. The scope of “home rule” is itself 
somewhat ambiguous, though courts are likely to include within that category any activity 
that has minimal effects outside the jurisdiction.  
Clayton P. Gillette & Paul B. Stephan III, Constitutional Limitations on Privatization, 46 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 481, 501 (1998). See also Gillette, supra note 22. 
 124. Briffault, supra note 5, at 391. 
 125. Here, Briffault is expressly referring to ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 
(Harvard Univ. Press 1970). 
 126. Briffault, supra note 5, at 393. 
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businesses.127 In Frug’s view, municipal economic activism would 
transform local political life by empowering workers, the poor, and 
consumers.128 Indeed, he contends that a municipal bank or insurance 
company “might make different judgments about the relative value it 
places on the profit margin, the kinds of loans that it deems socially useful, 
and the kinds of consumer protection it seeks to provide” than would 
private lenders.129 Municipal ownership of housing “could prevent 
gentrification of these units, and encourage democratic control over the 
operation of multiple-family housing.”130 In other words, city-owned 
enterprises could provide socially-oriented and beneficial programs.131 
In contrast, Ellickson, a prominent economic perspective legal scholar, 
argues that local governments already have relatively broad powers to 
participate in business activities.132 He contends that “during the twentieth 
century, state grants of power to cities have become more and more 
generous.”133 This is in part due to the fact that “state courts have 
considerably altered their interpretation of the constitutional and statutory 
texts that they once invoked to limit city business activities.”134 According 
to Ellickson, “Frug’s ‘powerless’ local governments currently develop 
housing complexes, retail stores, office buildings, sports stadiums, and 
redevelopment projects. They rent tools; own and operate distant vacation 
resorts; sell at retail products such as gasoline, liquor, light bulbs, and 
sportswear; and lend money to home-buyers and business enterprises.”135 
For example, in “Arizona, a state more rugged in its individualism than 
 
 
 127. See Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, supra note 120, at 1150; Frug, Property and Power, 
supra note 120, at 687–91. 
 128. See Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, supra note 120, at 1145–46. 
 129. See id. at 1150. 
 130. Frug, Property and Power, supra note 120, at 688. 
 131. Id. at 688–89. 
 132. Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519, 1568–
72 (1982). 
 133. Id. at 1569. Ellickson continues:  
Current mainstream economic theory, which would limit the role of government to instances 
of market failure, seems today to have little more constitutional relevance in most states than 
Herbert Spencer’s social statics.  
 . . . [T]he Supreme Court repeatedly held that the due process clause did not prevent 
states and cities from entering into businesses commonly carried out by private enterprise. 
Perhaps the broadest holding came in 1920, when the Court in Green v. Frazier [253 U.S. 
233 (1920)] unanimously sustained the constitutionality of a North Dakota statute that 
authorized the establishment of state banks, state mills and grain elevators, state 
homebuilding agencies, and other state enterprises. 
Id. at 1571–72. 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. at 1570–71. 
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most, a constitutional provision explicitly authorizes all cities ‘to engage 
in industrial pursuits.’”136  
Local public entrepreneurship in the United States includes a variety of 
public policies, as well as legal and financing techniques, available to local 
governments to encourage economic development. Notably, local 
governments’ business-oriented activism encompasses the exercise of 
eminent domain for land acquisitions, public-private partnerships for 
urban renewal projects, issuance of debt and securities (e.g., industrial 
development bonds), and municipalization of (as well as re-
municipalization of previously privatized) local services.137 On a more 
corporate level, local public entrepreneurship entails establishing public 
authorities138 and business improvement districts139 to finance urban 
renewal projects or local public services, and to carry out development 
projects.140 
VII. GLOBALIZATION’S INFLUENCE ON LOCAL PUBLIC 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Economic globalization requires local governments to compete 
globally. The key features of the globalization of the world economy are 
mobility of capital, large scale division of labor, advances in 
communications technology, large-scale migrations of citizens and 
reductions in travel time.141 Those features thrust cities into a primary role 
in global governance.142 Globalization encourages local government to 
create horizontal networks that foster interlocal cooperation and forces 
 
 
 136. Id. at 1571. 
 137. See Shelley Ross Saxer, Eminent Domain, Municipalization, and the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1505, 1515 (2005); see also Shelley Ross Saxer, Government Power 
Unleashed: Using Eminent Domain to Acquire a Public Utility or Other Ongoing Enterprise, 38 IND. 
L. REV. 55 (2005). 
 138. See Jonathan Rosenbloom, Can a Private Corporate Analysis of Public Authority 
Administration Lead to Democracy?, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 851 (2005–2006). “Public authorities are 
quasi-public independent entities generally created to provide one public service or undertake one 
public project such as transportation, school construction, housing, redevelopment, or financing.” Id. at 
851 n.1. 
 139. Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement Districts and Urban 
Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365, 414–17 (1999).  
 140. Id. at 420–25. 
 141. John Friedmann, The World Cities Hypothesis, in WORLD CITIES IN A WORLD SYSTEM 317–
18 (Paul Knox & Peter Taylor eds., 1995). 
 142. For the first academic accounts of this relatively new phenomenon, see generally Yishai 
Blank, Localism in the New Global Legal Order, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 263 (2006); Yishai Blank, The 
City and the World, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 875 (2006); Gerald E. Frug & David J. Barron, 
International Local Government Law, 38 URB. LAW. 1 (2006). 
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them to implement the programs of international organizations.143 The 
result is a diminution in national institutional and legislative influence 
over cities.144 In their new global standing, cities have become the object 
of international organization policies that promote new forms of urban 
governance145 and development strategies,146 and they are now subject to 
international trade and investment agreements147 and arbitral decisions.148  
The United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) 
and other international organizations comprised of city governments are 
attempting to codify the right to self-government in international law.149 
 
 
 143. Examples of such networks are United Cities and Local Governments, a group that advocates 
democratic local self-government, and the Cities Alliance, launched in 1999 by the World Bank and 
the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT). On the emergence of sub-
national networks, see generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004). 
 144. See John Friedmann, The World City Hypothesis, in WORLD CITIES IN A WORLD-SYSTEM 
317 (Paul L. Knox & Peter S. Taylor eds., 1995). 
 145. See UN-HABITAT, THE GLOBAL CAMPAIGN ON URBAN GOVERNANCE CONCEPT PAPER (2d 
ed. 2002), available at http://www.unhabitat.org/governance (follow “Reports” hyperlink); UN-
HABITAT, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS ADDRESSING GOOD GOVERNANCE 5 (2002), 
available at http://www.unhabitat.org/governance (follow “Reports” hyperlink; document under 
“Legislative Reform”). Also, see generally UN-HABITAT’s Global Campaign on Urban Governance, 
and in particular, information on Legislative Reform and the Campaign Overview, available at 
http://www.unhabitt.org/categories.asp?catid=25 (follow “Legislative Reform” and “Campaigns” 
hyperlinks). For discussion of new forms of urban governance, see generally NEIL BRENNER, NEW 
STATE SPACES: URBAN GOVERNANCE AND THE RESCALING OF STATEHOOD (2004); CITY MATTERS: 
COMPETITIVENESS, COHESION AND URBAN GOVERNANCE 349–403 (Martin Boddy & Michael 
Parkinson eds., 2004); CITIES TRANSFORMED: DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS IN THE 
DEVELOPING WORLD (Mark Montgomery et al eds., 2003). 
 146. THE WORLD BANK, CITIES IN TRANSITION 20 (2000), available at http://go.worldbank.org/ 
V8UGUNCWKO (last visited Nov. 8, 2007). See generally the World Bank’s Comprehensive 
Development Framework, available at http://go.worldbank.org/GS7LSYDFHO (last visited Nov. 8, 
2007); UNITED NATIONS, MONTERREY CONSENSUS ON FINANCING FOR DEVELOPMENT 5 (2002), 
available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd (last visited Nov. 8, 2007). For more general information on the 
World Bank’s urban development projects and policies, see the World Bank’s website section on 
“Urban Development,” http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTURBAN 
DEVELOPMENT/0,,menuPK:337184~pagePK:149018~piPK149093~theSitePK:337178,00.html (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2008). 
 147. On this subject, see generally ELLEN GOULD, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OF INTEREST TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (2004), available at 
http://www.civicnet.bc.ca (follow “Publications” hyperlink; “Guide to Info Services” hyperlink); H.V. 
SAVITCH & PAUL KANTOR, CITIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE (2002); Ward 
Ferdinandusse, Out of the Black-Box? The International Obligation of State Organs, 29 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 45, 66–71 (2003); Saskia Sassen, Introduction, in GLOBAL NETWORKS: LINKED CITIES 
(Saskia Sassen ed., 2002). 
 148. Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s Investment 
Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings” Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 30, 59–86 (2003). 
 149. See UN-HABITAT & World Associations of Cities and Local Authorities Coordination, 
Towards a World Charter of Local Self Government: Initial Draft Text of a World Charter of Local 
Self Government, http://www.gdrc.org/u-gov/charter.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2007) [hereinafter 
Initial Draft Text of a World Charter]. 
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They have drafted a World Charter of Local Self-Government (World 
Charter) that has yet to be presented to the UN General Assembly. It 
reveals the current state of international legal scholarship regarding local 
government.150 Many aspects of the World Charter resonate with the 
European Charter, which has been in force since 1988.151 
However, at the global level there has been a greater emphasis on the 
role of cities as international economic actors.152 The “world cities” 
concept acknowledges the importance of local public entrepreneurship and 
partially resembles that of Martinotti’s third-generation cities—cities with 
the goal of attracting worldwide investment.153 At the same time, this 
concept stresses the importance of democratic participation and poverty 
reduction policies. 
The World Bank maintains that “[u]rbanization, when well managed, 
facilitates sustained economic growth and thereby promotes broad social 
welfare gains,”154 while emphasizing the need for cities to become livable, 
competitive, and bankable.155 This requires that cities eliminate 
burdensome regulation and transaction costs, facilitate public-private 
partnerships, and promote best practices. The World Bank’s stated goal is 
to improve the lives of the poor in the world’s cities.156  
 
 
 150. The draft recognizes and requires protection in domestic legislation of local self-governance. 
Id. art. 2. As to the meaning of local self-government, the draft includes therein “the right and the 
ability of local authorities, within the limits of the law, to regulate and manage a substantial share of 
public affairs under their own responsibility and in the interests of the local population” Id. art. 3. On 
the level of financial autonomy, local authorities shall hold “adequate financial resources of their own, 
of which they may dispose freely within the framework of their powers.” Id. art. 9 § 1. 
 151. See Charter of Local Self-Government, supra note 37.  
 152. SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY: NEW YORK, LONDON, TOKYO 3–4 (1991). Today, cities 
function in four new ways: first, as concentrated command points in the organization of the 
world economy; second, as key locations for finance and specialized service firms, which 
have replaced manufacturing as the leading economic sectors; third, as sites of production, 
including the production of innovations in these leading industries; and fourth, as markets for 
the products and innovations produced. 
Id.  
 153. Guido Martinotti, A City for Whom? Transients and Public Life in the Second-Generation 
Metropolis, in THE URBAN MOMENT: COSMOPOLITAN ESSAYS ON THE LATE-20TH-CENTURY CITY 
165 (Robert A. Beauregard & Sophie Body-Gendrot eds., 1999). Martinotti elaborates three stages of 
cities. “First generation” cities serve their own residents and focus on providing them municipal 
services. Id. at 160–62. “Second generation” cities emphasize their relationship with nonresident users, 
such as tourists and commuters, and focus on attracting these outsiders by building convention centers, 
sports stadiums, theme parks, and the like. Id. at 162–65. “Third generation” cities’ main goal is to 
attract worldwide business and focus on making the city attractive to business executives. Id. at 165. 
 154. THE WORLD BANK, CITIES IN TRANSITION, supra note 146, at 2. 
 155. Id. at 8–14. 
 156. Id. at 1. 
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The Cities Alliance157 follows the World Bank’s Cities in Transition 
approach, proposing that “[c]ities and towns are essentially markets,”158 
and that it is essential to unleash their potential by modernizing economies 
with city-supported infrastructure and private investments.159 “The most 
fundamental requirements for a productive urban economy include 
available and affordable land for firms and for housing and transport 
networks that promote the mobility of both goods and workers.”160 UN-
HABITAT adopts a similar strategic vision. It seeks to “promote pro-poor 
urban governance”161 and views “the city as an organizing agent for 
national development.”162 In its Global Campaign on Urban Governance, 
UN-HABITAT emphasizes governance rather than government and the 
strategic value of public-private partnerships and democratic participation, 
making “stakeholder” consensus a key feature of local decision making.163  
VIII. TWO CASE LAW STUDIES 
This section presents case studies from two opinions, one each arising 
out of the E.C.J. and the U.S. Supreme Court. In both cases, the courts 
scrutinized local government economic entrepreneurship. This 
entrepreneurship played a major role in fostering local government 
innovation and enhancing community well-being in both cases. However, 
as I discuss, E.C.J. jurisprudence currently discourages local governments 
from engaging in such activities, thereby undermining the right to local 
self-governance. Conversely, the U.S. legal system actively encourages 
local public entrepreneurship in order to facilitate urban services and 
infrastructure. 
 
 
 157. The Cities Alliance is an organization focused on poverty reduction and on creating “cities 
without slums.” 
 158. Cities Alliance, 2004 Annual Report 4, available at http://www.citiesalliance.org. 
 159. Id. at 3. 
 160. Id. at 7. 
 161. Governing Council of UN-HABITAT, Update of the UN-HABITAT Strategic Vision § 36, 
U.N. Doc. HSP/GC/19/INF/10 (Apr. 25, 2003), available at http://www.unhabitat.org/downloads/ 
docs/1785_31621_K0361420.pdf. 
 162. Id. § 3. 
 163. See generally UN-HABITAT, THE GLOBAL CAMPAIGN ON URBAN GOVERNANCE CONCEPT 
PAPER, supra note 145. In addition, the Founding Declaration of United Cities and Local Governments 
blends the defense of local democracy with the enhancement of cities’ “strategic role in economic 
development.” United Cities and Local Governments, Founding Congress Final Declaration § 21 
(2004), available at http://www.dsf-fsn.org/en/documents/Declaration-UCLG-en.pdf. 
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A. The EU Debate on In-House Operations 
In recent years, the E.C.J. has developed substantial jurisprudence on 
“in-house operations.” Under the “in-house” umbrella, public authorities 
award public contracts to entities that have a distinct legal personality but 
are partially or wholly owned by the contracting authority itself.164 The 
E.C.J.’s findings, together with the analysis provided by the Advocates 
General, represent dissatisfaction with this concept of local public 
entrepreneurship. 
1. The Teckal Criteria and the Substantive Scope of the In-House 
Exemption 
The first opportunity for the E.C.J. to consider in-house operations 
came in Gemeente Arnhem v. BFI Holdings BV.165 At issue was whether 
the award of a public service contract to a public limited liability company 
jointly incorporated by two Dutch municipalities was subject to E.C. 
public procurement rules. Advocate General La Pergola contended that the 
company’s formation was a measure of administrative reorganization and 
the award of public responsibilities to the company was to be construed as 
an “inter-department delegation,” thereby escaping the scope of the (old) 
Public Service Contracts Directive.166 However, the E.C.J. did not address 
this issue.167 
 
 
 164. Advocate General Kokott explains in Parking Brixen, 
In-house operations stricto sensu are transactions in which a body governed by public law 
awards a contract to one of its departments which does not have its own legal personality. 
Largo sensu, however, in-house operations may also include certain situations in which 
contracting authorities conclude contracts with companies controlled by them which do have 
their own legal personality. Whereas in-house operations stricto sensu are by definition 
irrelevant for the purposes of procurement law, since they involve transactions wholly 
internal to the administration, in-house operations largo sensu (sometimes called ‘quasi-in-
house operations’) frequently raise the difficult question whether or not there is a requirement 
to put them out to tender. 
Case C-458/03, Parking Brixen GmBH v. Gemeinde Brixen, 2005 ECR 1-8585, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/RECH_jursprudence.doc (follow “Advocate General’s Opinion,” “Search”) (last visited 
Nov. 9, 2007). There are three in-house or quasi-in-house scenarios: an award to a company wholly 
owned by a contracting authority or entity equated with that authority; an award to a joint public 
company, the shares of which are held by a number of contracting authorities; and, a award to a semi-
public company, in which genuinely private parties hold a majority or minority stake. Id.  
 165. Case C-360/96, Gemeente Arnhem v. BFI Holding BV, 1998 E.C.R. I-6821 [hereinafter 
Gemeente Arnhem]. See also Rhodri Williams, The “Arnhem” Case: Definition of “Body Governed by 
Public Law,” 8 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 5 (1999); Evangelia Papangeli, The Application of the 
EU’S Works, Supplies and Services Directives to Commercial Entities, 9 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 
201 (2000). 
 166. Gemeente Arnhem, supra note 165, at I-6840. See also Rhodri Williams, The Scope of the EC 
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R.I.SAN Srl v. Comune di Ischia concerned a public service contract 
awarded to an Italian company, the capital of which was held as to 51% of 
the contracting authority itself and as to 49% of a central government 
undertaking.168 Advocate General Siegert Alber maintained that whether 
one contracting authority exercises a “decisive influence” over another 
entity is determinative of whether an “in-house” relationship exists.169 
In its landmark Teckal decision,170 the E.C.J. forged a hermeneutic 
method that has subsequently been adopted to evaluate in-house 
operations in all cases. Teckal concerned the direct award to an interlocal 
consortium (forty-five municipalities) of a contract to operate the heating 
systems of several municipal buildings, including the contracting 
authority.171 The key issue in the case was whether granting a public 
service to an entity of which the contracting authority is a member is 
subject to the detailed E.C. rules on public procurement. The E.C.J. carved 
out the basic elements of an in-house operation and extended it to relations 
between a contracting authority and entities having a distinct legal 
personality, provided that certain conditions are met. Most notably, an in-
house relation exists if “the local authority exercises over the person 
concerned a control which is similar to that which it exercises over its own 
departments and, at the same time, that person carries out the essential part 
of its activities with the controlling local authority or authorities.”172  
Thus, substantive subordination to the contracting authority of a 
publicly-controlled legal entity in regards to decision-making and 
operating functions does not trigger the applicability of E.C. rules on 
public procurement. As to the scope of the in-house derogation, Teckal 
generalized the principle explicitly foreseen only in Article 6 of the Public 
Service Contracts Directive and extended the application of the in-house 
rule to public contracts outside public services.173  
 
 
Public Procurement Directives: An Analysis of the Arnhem Decision, 8 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 
43, 49 (1999). 
 167. Gemeente Arnhem, supra note 165, at I-6851–52. The E.C.J. canvassed instead the corporate 
structure of the company to establish whether it constituted a “body governed by public law” (i.e., 
having legal personality, subject to public control and established for meeting needs in the general 
interest, not having an industrial or commercial character), falling therefore within the scope of the 
“in-house” explicit exemption set forth in Article Six of the old Public Service Contracts Directive. Id.  
 168. Case C-108/98, RI.SAN. Srl v. Comune di Ischia, 1999 E.C.R. I-5219, I-1542. 
 169. Id. at I-5234. On the basis of functional considerations, he concluded that even without 
knowing all the organizational details of the entity in question, it formed a part of the Italian State by 
the mere fact that the state owned 100% of its shares. Id. at I-5234–35. 
 170. Case C-107/98, Teckal Srl v. Comune di Viano, 1999 E.C.R. I-8121 [hereinafter Teckal]. 
 171. Teckal, supra note 170, at I-8147–249. 
 172. Id. at I-8154.  
 173. The contract at issue concerned both the provision of services and the supply of goods. 
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Since Teckal, the E.C.J. has broadened the scope of “in-house” services 
to include public supply and infrastructure works contracts,174 as well as 
concession agreements175 granted by a public authority,176 whereby the 
local government, acting as a contracting authority, exercises oversight 
over the awardee company substantially equivalent to that exercised on its 
own internal services, and the awardee dedicates the majority of its 
activities to the authority that controls it.177 
 
 
However, as the value of the latter was greater than the value of former, the E.C.J. ruled on the basis of 
the old Public Supplies Contracts Directive. Id. at I-8152–53. 
 174. Case C-26/03, Stadt Halle v. Arbeitsgemeinschaft Thermische Restabfall-und 
Energieverwertungsanlage TREA Leuna, 2005 E.C.R. I-1; Case C-29/04, Comm’n v. Rep. of Austria, 
2005 E.C.R. I-9705; Case C-340/04, Carbotermo SpA v. Comune di Busto Arsizio, 2006 E.C.R. I-
4137 [hereinafter Carbotermo]. 
 175. See Council Directive 04/18, art. 1 § 4, 2004 O.J. (L 134) 114. A “‘service concession’ is a 
contract of the same type as a public service contract except for the fact that the consideration for the 
provision of services consists either solely in the right to exploit the service or in this right together 
with payment.” Id. at 127. A similar definition is drawn for public works concessions. Id.  
 176. See Case C-231/03, Consorzio Aziende Metano v. Comune di Cingia de’ Botti, 2005 E.C.R. 
I-7287; Case C-458/03, Parking Brixen GmbH v. Gemeinde Brixen, 2005 E.C.R. I-8612 [hereinafter 
Parking Brixen]; Case C-410/04, Associazione Nazionale Autotrasporto Viaggiatori (ANAV) v. 
Comune di Bari, 2006 E.C.R. I-3303 [hereinafter ANAV]. “Notwithstanding the fact that, as 
Community law stands at present, [public services or works concession contracts] are excluded from 
the scope of Directive 93/38, the contracting entities concluding them are, none the less, bound to 
comply with the fundamental rules of the [E.C.] Treaty, in general, and the principle of non-
discrimination on the ground of nationality, in particular.” Case C-324/98, Telaustria Verlags GmbH v. 
Telekom Austria AG, 2000 E.C.R. I-10745, I-10746 [hereinafter Telaustria]. The E.C. Treaty 
prohibits discrimination on grounds of nationality. E.C. Treaty, supra note 73, art. 12. Regarding 
provisions on public service concessions, Article 43 states, “restrictions on the freedom of 
establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be 
prohibited.” Id. Also, “restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Community shall be 
prohibited in respect of nationals of Member States who are established in a State of the Community 
other than that of the person for whom the services are intended.” Id. art. 49. The E.C.J. interprets 
Articles 43 and 49 as specific expressions mandating equal treatment. See Case C-3/88, Comm’n v. 
Italy, 1989 E.C.R. 4035, 4059. It interprets the prohibition on discrimination on grounds of nationality 
similarly. See Case 810/79, Überschär v. Bundesversicherungsanstalt, 1980 E.C.R. 2747, 2764–65. In 
its case law relating to Community directives on public procurement, the E.C.J. affords equal 
opportunity to all tenderers when formulating their tenders, regardless of their nationality. See Case C-
87/94, Comm’n v. Belgium, 1996 E.C.R. I-2043, I-2076, I-2097. As a result, the principle of equal 
treatment of tenderers must be applied to public service concessions, even absent nationality 
discrimination. In addition, the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination imply a duty of 
transparency, which enables the concession-granting public authority to ensure that they are complied 
with. It “consists [of] ensuring, for the benefit of any potential tenderer, a degree of advertising 
sufficient to enable the service market to be opened up to competition and the impartiality of 
procurement procedures to be reviewed.” Telaustria, supra, at I-10746. 
 177. In Stadt Halle, the E.C.J. held that:  
A public authority which is a contracting authority has the possibility of performing the tasks 
conferred on it in the public interest by using its own administrative, technical and other 
resources, without being obliged to call on outside entities not forming part of its own 
departments. In such a case, there can be no question of a contract for pecuniary interest 
concluded with an entity legally distinct from the contracting authority. There is therefore no 
need to apply the Community rules in the field of public procurement. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss2/3
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008] LOCAL PUBLIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP 247 
 
 
 
 
Moreover, the E.C.J. has asked for the fulfillment of the Teckal test in 
cases where the purpose of the procurement laws is to ensure a transparent 
and non-discriminatory selection of private contractors could have no 
foundation. In Commission v. Spain,178 the E.C.J. upheld the application of 
Teckal to inter-administrative cooperation agreements formed between 
two or more public legal entities. This determines whether the contract in 
question falls under the scope of the Public Procurement Directives or 
under the “in-house” exemption. In Commission v. France179 and more 
recently in Auroux v. Commune de Roanne,180 the E.C.J. utilized the 
Teckal test for urban renewal projects. Auroux concerned a redevelopment 
agreement for a brownfield area and the construction of a leisure center in 
Roanne, France.181 The Municipal Council authorized the mayor to sign a 
contract with a semi-public company owned by the Region of Loire.182 
The Court stated that the agreement showed that the construction of the 
leisure center was intended to house commercial and service activities 
designed to regenerate an area of Roanne, thus fulfilling an “economic 
 
 
Stadt Halle, supra note 174, ¶ 48. 
 178. Case C-84/03, Comm’n v. Spain, 2005 E.C.R. I-139; Martin Dischendorfer, Issues under the 
EC Procurement Directives: A Note on Case C-84/03, Commission v Spain, 14 PUB. PROC. L. REV. 78 
(2005). 
 179. Case C-264/03, Comm’n v. France, 2005 ECR I-8831. 
 180. Case C-220/05, Auroux v. Commune de Roanne, 2007 E.C.R. I-389. 
 181. Id. ¶¶ 13–14. 
 182. Id. ¶ 2. In 2002, the French municipality of Roanne decided, as an urban development 
measure, to construct a leisure center in the area close to the railway station, including a multiplex 
cinema, commercial premises, a public car park, access roads and public spaces. See id. ¶ 13. The 
construction of other commercial premises and a hotel were envisaged subsequently. Id. In order to 
implement this project, the municipality of Roanne awarded a semi-public development company (the 
Société d’équipement du department de la Loire), to acquire land, obtain funding, carry out studies, 
organize an engineering competition, undertake construction works, coordinate the project and keep 
the municipality informed. Id. ¶ 15. The Administrative Tribunal of Lyon asked the E.C.J. to establish 
whether the award of the contract to the regional company constituted an award of a public works 
contract subject to a call for competition in accordance with E.C. directives concerning the 
coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts. Id. ¶ 20(1). As to whether the 
development agreement constituted a public works contract, the E.C.J. first reasoned that the directive 
concerning the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts defines a public 
works contract as any written contract, concluded for pecuniary interest between a contractor and a 
contracting authority (State, local authority, body governed by public law) whose purpose is, in 
particular, the design and/or execution of works, or a work corresponding to the requirements specified 
by the contracting authority. See id. ¶ 6. 
 The E.C.J. noted that SEDL, a contractor within the meaning of the directive, id. ¶ 44, was 
engaged by the municipality on the basis of an agreement concluded in writing. Id. ¶ 43. It observed 
that, although the agreement to engage SEDL contained an element providing for the supply of 
services, its main purpose was the construction of a leisure center, which involved work within the 
meaning of the directive. Id. ¶¶ 46–47. The E.C.J. stated that it was irrelevant that SEDL did not 
execute the work itself but instead delegated that work to subcontractors. Id. ¶ 44. 
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function.”183 As such, it must be regarded as an ordinary public works 
contract.184 
The application of Teckal to specific cases reveals that its two criteria 
are blurry. The E.C.J. interprets them very strictly because their fulfillment 
deactivates the E.C. public procurement legislation and principles. The 
burden of proof is on the person seeking such derogation.185 This narrow 
interpretation means that it is often unlikely that the Teckal criteria will be 
met.186 Unfortunately, unrestrained formalism in construing these criteria 
jeopardizes local entrepreneurship, innovation and new forms of interlocal 
cooperation.  
2. Teckal’s Effect on Local Public Entrepreneurship 
Recently, the E.C.J. has tried to place the Teckal criteria in context. It is 
difficult to prove that a contracting authority controls its legally distinct 
contractor the way it controls its own departments. The “similar control” 
criterion should be adapted to the factual context and applied flexibly. 
Unfortunately, the E.C.J. has narrowed the scope of in-house operations, 
rendering them barely realistic.  
In Stadt Halle, the E.C.J. held that the award of public responsibilities 
to public-private companies is not an “in-house” operation and is therefore 
subject to the E.C. public procurement rules.187 This holding affects local 
public-private partnerships188 such as major, long-term projects for 
services relating to transportation, public health, and waste management. 
After Stadt Halle, contracting authorities are obliged to apply Public 
Procurement Directives twice (once for the choice of the private 
shareholder and once for the choice of the contractor) and may be 
prevented from using this form of cooperation.189 And, in Parking Brixen 
 
 
 183. Id. ¶ 41. 
 184. Id. ¶ 47. 
 185. Stadt Halle, supra note 174, ¶ 46; Parking Brixen, supra note 176, ¶ 63; ANAV, supra note 
176, ¶ 26.  
 186. For instance, Advocate General Cosmas opined that the “control criterion” was unlikely to be 
met in a case where forty-five municipalities owned the entity in question and the contracting authority 
had only 0.9% share of the entity’s capital. Teckal, supra note 170, at I-8136. 
 187. See Stadt Halle, supra note 174. 
 188. Public-private partnerships are neither regulated nor defined at the European level. Before 
Stadt Halle, it was not clear whether the assignment of public tasks to such entities in the form of 
public contract or concession fell within the scope of the Public Procurement Directives. See id. 
 189. See Commission Communication on Public-Private Partnerships and Community Law on 
Public Procurement and Concessions 8, COM (2005) 569 final (Nov. 15, 2005). The European 
Commission plans to publish an interpretative Communication to clarify the limits of the public 
procurement rules’ application to joint undertakings between the public and the private sector. This 
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and Commission v. Austria, the E.C.J. made clear that the award of 
concessions or contracts even to wholly owned subsidiaries of contracting 
authorities may be subject to the public procurement regime.190  
In Carbotermo, the E.C.J. refined the second Teckal criterion.191 It 
interpreted the “essential part of activities” factor to require that the entity 
is “devoted principally” to the contracting authority and “any other 
activities are only of marginal significance.”192 As a result, national judges 
must carry out qualitative and quantitative analyses of the facts.193 This 
assessment applies to any activities carried out under a contract awarded 
by the contracting authority, regardless of who the beneficiary is (the 
contracting authority or the user of the services) or who pays the 
contractor.194 
Such extensive interference in municipalities’ self-governance and 
organizational discretion is, even from the standpoint of the market, 
extremely disproportionate.195 In Parking Brixen, Advocate General 
Kokott noted,  
After all, the purpose of procurement law is to ensure that 
contractors are selected in a transparent and non-discriminatory 
manner in all cases where a public body has decided to use third 
parties to perform certain tasks. However, the spirit and purpose of 
procurement law is not also to bring about, “through the back 
door,” the privatisation of those public tasks which the public body 
would like to continue to perform by using its own resources. This 
would require specific liberalisation measures on the part of the 
legislature.196 
Through its use of the phrase “control similar to that which,” Teckal 
indicates that a local authority has different possibilities to influence its 
 
 
initiative, although soft law, will guide the selection of private partners participating in public 
partnerships and contribute, to a better understanding of relevant E.C.J. case law. See Sue Arrowsmith, 
Public-Private Partnerships and the European Procurement Rules: EU Policies in Conflict? 37 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 709 (2000); L. Hausmann & J. Denecke, Changes to German Public 
Procurement Legislation by the PPP Acceleration Act, 14 PUB. PROC. L. REV. 195 (2005).  
 190. Parking Brixen, supra note 176, at I-8612; Comm’n v. Austria, supra note 174, at I-9705. 
 191. Carbotermo, supra note 174, at I-4137. 
 192. Id. ¶ 63. 
 193. Id. ¶ 65. 
 194. Id. ¶ 65–67. 
 195. See Charter of Local Self-Government, supra note 37. Article 6(1) provides that local 
authorities must “be able to determine their own internal administrative structures in order to adapt 
them to local needs and ensure effective management.” Id.  
 196. Parking Brixen, supra note 176, at I-8585. 
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own departments and public undertakings.197 Whether a contractor is akin 
to an administrative department or other market operators is not based on 
whether, from a formal point of view, the public body has the same 
possibilities in law as it does in relation to its own departments (for 
example, the right to give instructions in a particular case). Rather, the 
issue is whether, in practice, the contracting authority attains its public-
interest objectives fully at all times.  
It is practically impossible for most public or private undertakings to 
fulfill this second Teckal criterion. Contracting authorities comply with 
procurement rules before concluding contracts with their subsidiaries, 
insofar as those subsidiaries are organized as public or private limited 
companies. Therefore, the choice of a public or private limited company as 
a form of organization is appreciably less attractive. Such extensive 
interference with the organizational sovereignty of the Member States and, 
in particular, with the self-government of many municipalities is not 
necessary for the market-opening purposes of public procurement law. 
The E.C.J. case law on in-house operations deserves at least careful re-
reading, if not complete re-thinking, due to these local self-governance 
implications. Teckal intended to preserve local governments’ sphere of 
self-governance regarding organization and service provision. 
Subsequently, the E.C.J. expanded “in-house” to apply to all other types of 
public contracts.198 The expansion of this category triggered the E.C.J.’s 
interpretive self-restraint. Sometimes this attitude led the E.C.J. to deeply 
weaken local governments’ entrepreneurial discretion, as well as interlocal 
cooperation.  
B. The U.S. Debate on the “Public Use” Issue 
U.S. local public entrepreneurship is more developed than its European 
counterpart, and American local governments are more conscious of their 
intrinsic entrepreneurial nature than are those in the EU. U.S. local 
governments’ business-oriented strategies involve a wide variety of public 
policies designed to nurture and trigger economic development.199 This 
business-like activism encompasses the exercise of eminent domain. 
Eminent domain is used to assemble land for economic development. I use 
 
 
 197. Teckal, supra note 170, at I-8121. 
 198. The Community procurement regime does not provide an “in-house” provision similar to the 
one foreseen for in the E.C. Directive concerning the coordination of public service contracts awarding 
procedure. 
 199. Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement Districts and Urban 
Governance, supra note 139, at 423. 
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the example of eminent domain to illustrate the U.S. judiciary’s attitude 
toward local government political economy. A recent U.S. Supreme Court 
ruling, Kelo v. City of New London,200 has endorsed a municipality’s right 
to condemn private land for economic development purposes.  
Professor Gillette describes the power of eminent domain as “necessary 
to cure what is itself a political problem—the capacity of individual 
private property holders to frustrate majority will by refusing to sell 
privately held land for public purposes.”201 Gillette signals the risk of 
abuse because local officials may take private property even when public 
benefits would be lacking. The provision of the “public use” requirement 
as a prerequisite to condemn, and the imposition of just compensation, is 
meant to deter public officials from exercising taking powers when public 
costs exceed public benefits.202 But Gillette underlines that in light of the 
erratic nature of twin safeguards, they shall work as safety valves in order 
to guarantee that “systemic abuse will create political backlash.”203 The 
fear of electoral redress effectively constrains local officials.204 
In many economic development programs in which local governments 
play a role, the power to acquire land through eminent domain is crucial. 
Practically every state has adopted legislation on land assembly through 
eminent domain.205 Such legislation authorizes the use of eminent domain 
mainly in urban renewal projects which have economic redevelopment as 
their primary objective.206 Some states have also enacted new legislation 
that, regardless of urban renewal aims, authorizes the use of eminent 
domain for economic development.207 The use of eminent domain for 
economic development has sometimes been used to convey the land the 
 
 
 200. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 201. Gillette, supra note 12, at 14–15. 
In theory, publicly interested officials will use the condemnation power only to solve what is 
called the “land assembly” problem and only to do so where the result is to confer net benefits 
on their constituents, that is, only to make residents as a whole better off, even though some 
of those residents will lose private property that they might have preferred to retain. 
Id. at 15. 
 202. Steve P. Calandrillo, Eminent Domain Economics: Should “Just Compensation” Be 
Abolished, and Would “Takings Insurance” Work Instead?, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 451, 490–91 (2003) 
(citing Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 
“Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967)). 
 203. Gillette, supra note 12, at 16. 
 204. Id. at 16. 
 205. Daniel R. Mandelker, Public Entrepreneurship: A Legal Primer, C629 ALI-ABA 587 
(1991). 
 206. David M. Lawrence, Constitutional Limitations on Government Participation in Downtown 
Renewal Projects, 35 VAND. L. REV. 277 (1982).  
 207. Mandelker, supra note 205, at 587. 
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governmental agent acquires to a private entity, which then carries out a 
development project.208  
Thus, a question of constitutionality arises. All states share federal 
constitutional limitations on the use of their eminent domain power. 
However, U.S. courts have construed the notion of “public use” very 
broadly to also include “economic development.”209 This reflects a 
“deference to legislative judgments about the proper use of public 
expenditures and the proper interaction between government and 
business.”210 
In Kelo, the U.S. Supreme Court recited the conditions under which the 
judiciary must refrain from interfering with local political economic 
decision-making and rejected “any monolithic metric for economic 
development.”211 As Gillette underscores, the Court deferred to the 
political assessments of the locality and its “carefully considered” 
economic plan.212 The Court limited its analysis to “apparent political 
process failure that courts could detect and correct better than the political 
process itself.”213 It noted that nothing in New London’s development plan 
was adopted “to benefit a particular class of identifiable individuals.”214 
Judicial intervention in local government and economic development 
activities must be restrained in some circumstances. Kelo “articulate[s] 
those conditions under which judicial intervention is warranted.”215 In 
Gillette’s view, the Kelo Court explains its deference to the City of New 
London when holding that the case “turned on the question [of] whether 
the City’s development plan serves a ‘public purpose.’”216 The Court held 
that “[t]he City has carefully formulated an economic development plan 
that it believes will provide appreciable benefits to the community.”217 
 
 
 208. Id. 
 209. “Promoting economic development is a traditional and long accepted function of 
government.” Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484. 
 210. See Gillette, supra note 12, at 16–17. 
 211. Id. at 17. The Court did not restate the so-called blight requirement. Id. The original state 
statutes approved the use of eminent domain in urban renewal projects, provide that the land to be 
acquired through the exercise of eminent domain was located in an area that had been designated as 
“blighted.” The type of area that conventionally has been called “blighted” is an area that contains 
substandard housing or nonresidential buildings. Id. at 16–17. All state courts have upheld the 
acquisition of blighted areas under the eminent domain power as a sufficient basis to prove public use 
or public purpose of the redevelopment of the cleared land by a private entity. Id 
 212. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478. 
 213. Gillette, supra note 12, at 17. 
 214. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478. 
 215. Gillette, supra note 12, at 17. 
 216. Id. at 480. 
 217. Id. at 483. 
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Therefore, “given the comprehensive character of the plan, [and] the 
thorough deliberation that preceded its adoption,” the Court reviewed the 
plan as a whole to determine whether it satisfied the public purpose 
requirement.218 
Europeans judges can learn from Kelo and the foregoing American 
jurisprudence on the interaction between local economies and local 
governments. For one, “the flexibility in defining the proper relationship 
between local government and the local economy is what makes the 
inquiry uniquely unsuitable for judicial investigation.”219 
In addition, European legislatures should learn from U.S. state laws 
enacted post-Kelo that introduced “procedural safeguards, such as hearing 
requirements, to the condemnation process.”220 Gillette argues that 
“openness and opportunity for collective action will generate more 
publicly-interested decisions and reduce the risk of abuses.”221 Gillette 
properly underscores that Kelo fits within the American jurisprudential 
“tradition of counteracting the need for flexibility in urban planning with 
political process protections.”222 The same result would ensue in a case in 
which business and government interacted in a public policy field other 
than urban renewal.  
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Cities should be allowed to engage in business activities or make 
strategic decisions like business players. In particular, they should be able 
to step into the economic arena or back-up private projects to foster 
economic growth because cities compete with each other to gain new 
investors, citizens and lenders. The overall aim is to improve the 
competitiveness and well-being of their jurisdictions by providing new or 
better public services and infrastructure, and by increasing their tax-base 
or debt leverage.  
 
 
 218. Id. at 484. 
 219. Gillette, supra note 12, at 19. Gillette’s claim is that: 
the capacity of the judiciary to make inquiries into the process, to reverse engineer the 
political decision to determine whether it was tainted or whether the same decision would 
have been reached on objective grounds, is minimal. Thus, perhaps the best that a court can 
do is to define the conditions under which the probability of abuse is minimal and defer to the 
political process when those criteria are satisfied. 
Id. at 20. 
 220. Id. at 20. 
 221. Id.  
 222. Id. at 16. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
254 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 7:215 
 
 
 
 
Local governments are both political and economic entities. They 
represent a form of human organization which shares both a governmental 
and an associative nature. Consequently, they feature characteristics of 
both public and commercial entities. Therefore, local governments should 
be granted political liberty (the right to local self-government) and 
economic liberty (the right to provide public local goods and engage in 
economic activities for local development).223 For these reasons, 
legislatures should recognize and protect local public entrepreneurship. 
Correspondingly, judges should adopt a more deferential approach to such 
activities. 
Briffault is right when he warns that the “widespread use of local 
government structures,” for the implementation of pro-business policies 
threatens abuse of “the coercive power of the state for private economic 
ends,” which circumvents direct democratic control.224 To avoid abuses, 
however, the legislature does not have to deny or frustrate local 
governments’ autonomy.  
Therefore, democratic counterbalances are crucial. Intervention should 
not be left only to the judiciary. When the decision is of a purely political 
nature, citizens (directly or through their representatives) should have the 
last word. It is encumbent upon the legislature to design and implement 
democratic counterbalances that make local governments’ entrepreneurial 
initiatives (in the economic as well as social field) more participatory.225 
Finally, globalization has completely changed the characteristics of 
competition among local governments. Today, competition takes place in 
the international marketplace. Rising to this global challenge requires full 
development of a city’s entrepreneurial spirit. Local public 
entrepreneurship must foster interlocal cooperation; otherwise, local 
 
 
 223. Adam Smith argued that economic “liberism” (i.e., laissez-faire capitalism) would not come 
without political “liberalism,” and vice versa, in order for individuals to fully develop their 
personalities. Economic liberty is a key tool for political liberty. See ADAM SMITH, THEORY OF 
MORAL SENTIMENTS (1759). See also JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); ROBERT A. 
DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY (1985). See also MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE D. 
FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 2–3 (1980): 
Economic freedom is an essential requisite for political freedom. By enabling people to 
cooperate with one another without coercion or central direction, it reduces the area over 
which political power is exercised. In addition, by dispersing power, the free market provides 
an offset to whatever concentration of political power may arise. The combination of 
economic and political power in the same hands is a sure recipe for tyranny. 
For the purpose of this paper, the tyranny from which local governments need to be freed is that of 
national and regional governments that hinder their innovation and entrepreneurship. 
 224. Richard Briffault, Who rules at home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Governments, 60 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 339, 383 (1993). 
 225. See DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 259 (2006). 
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governments will not be able to face global competition. International 
codification and regulation of the right to local self government, with all 
its implications, including the right to economic entrepreneurship, is 
necessary.226 
 
 
 226. The Initial Draft Text of a World Charter, supra note 149, suggests this direction. 
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